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In this paper I examine two companies instigated by Sir Thomas 
Mcllwraith — the entrepreneur and politician who, with Sir Samuel 
Griffith, dominated Queensland political life for nearly twenty years.' 
1 shall examine their origins and stated intentions, describe their pro-
gress or lack of it, their territorial bases and personalities at the top 
and their collapse. 
Along the way some of the wider features of nineteenth-century 
Queensland history, at least from a financial and entrepreneurial 
point of view, might emerge; some insights into the small world of 
Brisbane legal, political and business circles might be gained; and 
some notion of the replacement of the old order of Squatterdom 
in some areas by the new breed of pastoralist-cum-capitalist will be 
considered. Attention will also be paid to the unsuccessful attempt 
by a few individual entrepreneurs to construct in this vast State a 
series of interlocking relationships between the State, business and 
banking structures, new technology, and a social and political 
philosophy that was a crude and unsatisfactory amalgam of imperial 
fervour, colonial liberalism and undiluted Social Darwinism.^ 
Between 1870 and 1894 two men towered above their contem-
poraries in the Queensland political scene: Sir Samuel Griffith, sub-
ject of the late Professor Joyce's monumental biography, and Sir 
Thomas Mcllwraith.^ 
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Mcllwraith was an Ayrshire Scot who had emigrated to Melbourne 
and the Mount Alexander goldfields in 1854, and prospered as a 
government railway engineer and private railway contractor in 
Victoria, while retaining family shipping interests. In the 'sixties he 
moved to Queensland where, after initial pastoral forays, he embark-
ed on a wide range of speculative and developmental investments 
of which the Queensland National Bank, Queensland Investment and 
Land Mortgage Company, the Darling Downs and Western Land 
Company, North Australian Pastoral Company and Mcllwraith, 
McEachern were the main concerns. These enterprises intermingled 
public and private business concerns to an extraordinary degree. A 
secret partner of the dynamic General Manager of the QNB, 
Colonel E. R. Drury, and personally and politically connected with 
such luminaries as Sir Arthur H. Palmer, John Macrossan, Boyd 
Dunlop Morehead, F. H. S. Hart and Patrick Perkins, Mcllwraith 
was Premier of Queensland between 1879 and 1882 and briefly again 
in 1888 and 1893.' In a Coalition Ministry with Griffith — the 
notable "Griffilwraith" — Mcllwraith was Colonial Treasurer 
1890-93 and, later. Chief Secretary. He advocated a transcontinen-
tal railway on the land grant principle, the annexation of New Guinea 
(which he blatantly attempted on behalf of Queensland in 1881), the 
encouragement of Queensland's infant industries through protective 
tariffs and chauvinist colonial nationalism, or rather "nativism". 
Mcllwraith attempted to transform Queensland into a "Big Man's 
Frontier" (to use Brian Fitzpatrick's phrase) of interlocking pastoral, 
processing, mining and transport enterprises, financed by British and 
Victorian/New South Wales capital and directed by a consortium 
of Brisbane entrepreneurs, politicians, merchants and pastoralists. 
Such objectives and aspirations inevitably placed Mcllwraith in 
opposition to both the remnants of the pioneer squattocracy and 
those lawyers, shopkeepers and agrarian liberals who believed in 
advancing the interests of small property. In 1890, however, both 
groups could coalesce to combat the financial crisis, a rising labour 
movement and the apparent threat to all property, whether large or 
small. Over a decade earlier, however, Queensland's prospectus seem-
ed both glittering and safe. 
THE NORTH AUSTRALIAN PASTORAL COMPANY 
1 will discuss the North Australian Pastoral Company first because 
in spite of its apparently risky holdings of 23,000 square kilometres 
of the South Australian Government's Alexandria and Soudan leases 
in the Northern Territory, this largely Queensland-based pastoral 
and sugar lands enterprise long outlived the other company that I 
am examining. In one form or another it lasted for well over a hun-
dred years, a comparative rarity amongst Queensland-based 
corporations. 
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This enterprise was established in 1877 under the impetus of 
Thomas Mcllwraith in partnership with William Collins of 
Tamrookum Station near Beaudesert; William Forrest, a director 
of the leading Queensland mercantile firm of Moreheads Limited; 
J. H. B. Warner, a London financier; and Sir William Ingram, Bt, 
the proprietor of the Illustrated London News. Each shareholder 
held about £30,000 worth of shares in the venture during the 1880s 
except for Warner and Ingram who held half that sum. Originally 
known as Mcllwraith, Collins and Company, the concern merged 
several individual properties (2315 square kilometres of leasehold 
cattle stations), Woodstock, Inkerman, Jarvisfield and Leichhardt 
Downs along the Haughton and Burdekin Rivers with 32(X) hectares 
of freehold land capable of growing excellent sugar. Twenty thou-
sand head of shorthorn cattle of high breeding and fattening quali-
ty were grazed on this area to supply the Charters Towers, Townsville 
and Bowen meat markets. Both original partners were to have shares 
in the new Townsville and Bowen frozen meat processing plants. 
Moreover, the Charters Towers to Townsville railway bisected the 
northern end of the property.^ 
Another thousand miles or so away (to distort and plagiarise G. C. 
Bolton) lay 18,569 square miles (48,000 square kilometres) of North-
ern Territory land on a 25-year lease of sixpence per square mile 
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for the first seven years and then, if confirmed, ten shillings per 
square mile for the remainder of the time. The whole idea, as 
Mcllwraith explained to J. H. B. Warner in a letter of 4 April 1878, 
was to stock the Territory lands with Townsville store cattle, and 
then use the Territory as a breeding ground and animal reservoir 
for the North Queensland enterprises." Even conceding the possibility 
of the State resuming potential sugar lands for agricultural settle-
ment — a factor which the politico Mcllwraith implied he could well 
control — the Company would still benefit, both through added 
values for its Inkerman and Jarvisfield estates and through judicious 
disposal of its freeholds. Certainly, as Connolly in his work John 
Drysdale and ihe Burdekin remarks, these lands of the NAP Com-
pany were "by a happy chance situated so that no development could 
take place in the Burdekin-Townsville area without traversing some 
of them"." Indeed the construction of Central Sugar Mills by the 
Coalition Government of the early 1890s meant that the company, 
unlike most of the highly capitalised, purely sugar ventures along 
the coast, survived and prospered. 
Connolly's comment on these political, personal and pastoral 
interconnections and relationships, written in the early 'sixties, has 
for us in the decade of the takeover, the corporate state and the 
dynamic entrepreneur, a rather old-fashioned, nostalgic ring about 
it all. 
Mcllwraith, in his handling of Jarvisfield and Inkerman . . . does 
not seem to have regarded his actions as even faintly dubious. Yet, 
occupying the Premiership, Mcllwraith as a land speculator must 
have had foreknowledge of the intentions of the Land Commis-
sioner . . . Perhaps his speculative activities were not regarded as 
peculiar in the days of squatter government. In fairness to him, 
it should be said that there appeared nothing surreptitious about 
his procedures, rather the contrary.* 
As Mcllwraith himself suggested during the first year of the enter-
prise, on 22 October 1877, 
Since then [after taking up the Northern Territory leases] 1 with 
Mr Drury of the Queensland National Bank and Mr Tully, the 
Crown Lands Commissioner (a particular warm friend) have taken 
up 9,000 miles of what I have every reason to suppose is as good 
country as that settled by Forrest, Collins and 1.' 
Indeed it was Mcllwraith who lured William Forrest north with 
his promise on I4th July 1883 of a seat in the Legislative Council. 
In return Forrest lobbied Melbourne capitalists to support the 
Transcontinental Railway and persuaded Mcllwraith to make cer-
tain that his influence was brought to bear on making sure that 
critical areas of the NAP's Burdekin sugar holdings were freehold-
ed.'" On I8th September 1883, after helping with his brother John 
to ensure that Mcllwraith was re-elected as local Member for the 
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Mulgrave, William Forrest issued detailed instructions as to how the 
vital grazing, sugar and access components of the Inkerman runs 
could be secured by direct pressure on Perkins, Mcllwraith's Minister 
for Lands, before the Ministry gave up the seals of office to the 
incoming Griffith Administration. Even dummies were used at this 
late stage, proving that this hallowed device was still alive and well 
twenty years after they had first appeared on the run of the Darling 
Downs. Last, but not least, a sympathetic Police Magistrate was in-
stalled in the district to make certain that the cogs of justice, par-
ticularly the wheels of the electoral machinery, were well oiled and 
controlled by the proper people." 
MANAGEMENT POLICY 
All this came under the general working beliefs of the investing 
director. On 29th September 1883 William Forrest wrote to Thomas 
Mcllwraith stating that: 
We risked our money in land when it had but little value, and, 
if we, by spending more money, find it of value 1 contend that 
we, and not the Government, should reap the benefit . . .'-
From the start, as William Collins's instructions to the Inkerman 
manager John A. Townsend on 5th April 1878 disclose, sound ad-
vice, clear directions and firm control were the hallmarks of this 
enterprise where technical mastery, patience and solid knowledge had 
brought some measure of stability and success.'' The earlier optimism 
about the leaseholds on the Barkly Tablelands soon faded but the 
partners were able to run down the size of their holdings there without 
diminishing their assets. 
William Forrest's brother, John, later assumed Collins's 
managerial role; Mcllwraith's marriage settlement of 6th October 
1884 preserved his NAP interests from involvement in his general 
ruin; and the post-Federation sugar expansion on the Burdekin enabl-
ed the company to dispose of its coastal assets to the State in 1910-11 
for over £130,000, spread over several years and carrying just over 
3% interest." This was a similar arrangement to those made with 
the proprietors of Darling Downs freehold pastoral estates whose 
lands were now able to support a viable agricultural and dairy far-
ming population. 
All in all, almost alone of Thomas Mcllwraith's financial ventures, 
the NAP Company survived. The sugar town of Ayr, surveyed 
in 1882, is one of the few reminders of Mcllwraith's past presence, 
named as it is after his birthplace. 
The reasons for such survival — and survival was success in 
post-1893 Queensland — are instructive and useful for us when we 
consider the history of the next enterprise that I am to discuss. Some 
of these reasons have already been mentioned, either directly or by 
implication: judicious management; sober stocking and development 
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policies; substantial goldfields and urban markets; a resistance to 
the blandishments of the quickfire entrepreneur; purchased land that 
retained its value even if it did not immediately accelerate in price; 
and, above all, a manageable interest Bill on the i;40,000 investment 
that the Scottish Equitable Life Assurance Company had made in 
the company. The other financial and territorial interests of the part-
ners were kept separate from the affairs of this company and only 
a careful balance of political influence and administrative lubrica-
tion was used, as required, for both protection and preservation. 
THE DARLING DOWNS AND WESTERN LAND COMPANY 
Another great pastoral enterprise to be incorporated under the 
aegis of the Queensland National Bank was the "jewel in 
Mcllwraith's crown", the Darling Downs and Western Land Com-
pany, registered in Brisbane on 27th June 1881 with a nominal capital 
of £1 million in 10,000 £100 shares. Again masterminded by 
Mcllwraith, the basic concept was to merge the Central Queensland 
pastoral runs of Cork, Ayrshire Downs and Llanr-h-eidol near 
Winton (all held by Mcllwraith's private company) with his partner 
J. C. Smyth's Merivale Station on the northern Maranoa." These 
stations were amongst the finest wool and cattle producing units in 
Queensland, reasonably watered and affording substantial securi-
ty. As the industrial confrontations of 1891 and, more particularly, 
1894 demonstrated, they lay at the very heart of Queensland's large-
scale pastoral industry. 
The core of the new enterprise, however, was to be the famous 
Jimbour Estate on the Darling Downs and its two associated western 
leaseholds, Buaraba and Westlands. Since 1844 Jimbour, now largely 
freeholded or with leases relatively safe from resumption, had been 
the headquarters of the Bell family. 
Of Anglo-Irish origin (Co. Kildare), Thomas Bell and his sons 
Joshua Peter, John Alexander and Marmaduke had arrived in New 
South Wales about 1829. Joshua Peter, the epitome of the Darling 
Downs Pure Merino, had had a lengthy, if somewhat pedestrian, 
career in Queensland politics but on the incorporation of the com-
pany was the recently knighted (KCMG), gentlemanly President of 
the Legislative Council with a magnificent £30,000 rural seat at 
Jimbour rivalling many of the Irish seats of the Ascendancy, from 
the lower rungs of which the family had climbed. Agreeable, capable 
pastoralists with paternal touches of colonial liberalism, the Bells 
proved to be bluff innocents in the harsher world of Brisbane and 
London investment and speculative capital. 
For Jimbour, with its "Big House" pastoral village, benevolent 
and genial squires, apparently contented labour force and "pocket 
borough", electoral fiefdom was never to be the same again — nor 
were the Bells."' Nevertheless, Jimbour was cleverly designed to be 
408 
the sheet anchor of the whole enterprise — the base for the transfor-
mation of sheep and cattle properties into developed multi-resource 
units within one corporation, itself linked, as we have seen, to the 
Queensland National Bank, the Queensland Investment and Land 
Mortgage Company, the North Australian Pastoral Company and 
British, Brisbane and Melbourne investment." The company's ob-
jectives were wide and ambitious: to develop the resources of the 
pastoral properties by expanding the landed base and securing in-
vestment capital from debentures, and by improving the chain of 
stations so that surplus stock could be exported as frozen meat 
through proposed works at Rockhampton and Brisbane. In addi-
tion, the company was empowered to speculate in land, develop 
mineral and timber resources, subdivide areas for closer settlement 
and generally act not only as a pastoral enterprise but also as a land 
company on the American model.'* The risks were thought to be 
minimal, the properties sound and the dangers to the whole spread 
over components scattered across well over 500 miles of Queensland's 
finest pastoral country. Much of the basic pioneering work had been 
accomplished and although artesian water was still a decade away, 
the properties were reasonably well watered and close to railways 
or authorized lines. In the case of Jimbour, it was on the edge of the 
most densely settled area in Queensland, the south-east, and on the 
northern fringes of the finest estate, the Darling Downs. Further-
more, the agricultural problems bedevilling agrarian settlement in 
this region, the defensive measures to preserve their estate already 
taken by Bell and Sons, and the political clout of the first directors, 
Mcllwraith, Joshua Peter Bell and J. C. Smyth, made State resump-
tion and disruptions somewhat unlikely to say the least. 
Prospects for the enterprise seemed fair in 1881: 6,500 shares 
fully paid up to £65 per share had been issued to the vendors in return 
for their properties — 1,000 each to the three Bell brothers, 1,339 
to the family firm of Bell and Sons, 791 to Thomas Mcllwraith, and 
465 to J. C. Smyth. Once again familiar names such as the Duke 
of Manchester (200), Sir A. H. Palmer and his family, C. L. 
Williams, Sir Charles Stirling of Glasgow, E. R. Drury and the 
Minister of Lands, Patrick Perkins, put on to a "good thing" for 
£6,500 by Mcllwraith, made up the minority shareholding." This 
shareholding did not substantially change until July 1897 when the 
QNB purchased 200 shares from the Manchester estate. The com-
pany was finally wound up on 18th April 1900 when the remaining 
assets were largely transferred to the crippled but reconstructed and 
State-guaranteed Queensland National Bank and the Australian 
Mutual Provident Society.^" 
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GEARING UP FOR DISASTER 
Why had prospects that seemed so scintillating for the company 
in 1881, evaporated. After all, there were the excellent properties, 
well situated with a famous south-eastern base; and there was an 
apparently stable labour force whose remuneration had not really 
increased in real terms for twenty years, apart from certain rises for 
skilled technical workers. Moreover, managerial talent appeared 
abundant, experienced and capable. Thirdly, links with British and 
Brisbane capital seemed to produce pastoral chain-mail defences 
rather than a potentially vulnerable situation of interlocking deben-
tured dominoes. And finally, the entrepreneurial skills of the Premier 
and Treasurer, Thomas Mcllwraith, when welded to the managerial 
talents of his old Anglo-Irish partner J. C. Smyth, MLC, and the 
Pure Merino and political cachets associated with the Bell name, 
augured well for the new enterprise. 
Yet, by 1st July 1885, a bare four years after the formation of 
the company, private alarm bells were beginning to ring in Brisbane 
as they had already trilled in London and Glasgow. The first blows 
were of a character that perhaps professional historians in 
Queensland have sometimes paid too little attention to: the effects 
of climate and nature. On the night of 27th February 1881 the 
drought broke at last on Cork and Ayrshire Downs. In the words 
of the manager, Geoff Glissan: 
The Wolingham ran a banker and the sheep came down into the 
billabongs in the night and all [4,900] were drowned within 100 
yards of fine safe country . . . 12" of rain fell in four days.^' 
Nature again intervened on 20th December 1881 when Sir Joshua 
Bell collapsed and died in a Brisbane hansom cab, apparently after 
opening his bank statement from the Queensland National Bank. 
Bell was replaced by another Anglo-Irish-born squatter. Sir Arthur 
Palmer, as both Director of the Darling Downs and Western Land 
Company and President of the Legislative Council (to 1898). 
However Palmer's position as a relative by marriage to Sir Thomas 
Mcllwraith (their Mosman wives were sisters) and his pastoral ex-
perience could not compensate for the critical withdrawal of the 
chieftain of Jimbour. 
In spite of their apparent pastoral assets the Bell family finances 
were not in particularly good shape at amalgamation. Already by 
26th August 1882 the three interests — the J. P. Bell estate under 
the matriarch Lady Bell, J. A. Bell's absentee share and Mar-
maduke's third component — had all borrowed from the DD&WL 
Company against their shareholdings in the firm. £117,437 had 
already been advanced at 8% interest to finance the family's ac-
tivities, from living expenses to the £1,800 required for the funding 
of the Northern Downs and other elections in 1880." Thus the private 
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finances of the Bell family were already dangerously weak at incor-
poration and takeover. Characteristically, and not unlike some of 
their compatriots in Ireland in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Bells, living beyond their means at the mortgage manor 
at Jimbour and in Brisbane, became isolated from decisions, and 
grew increasingly embittered and distressed. On 17th September 1884 
J. Alexander Bell wrote to Mcllwraith, now out of office and tem-
porary business manager at Jimbour which he was using as his coun-
try seat and headquarters, that: 
1 object to a single acre, rood or perch of any land being sold or 
disposed of in any way belonging to the late firm of Bell & Sons." 
For the next ten years a subterranean quarrel rumbled on between 
the Bells, the Palmers, Mcllwraith and the Directors and Manager 
of the QNB, only to subside finally after the ruin of the enterprises 
we are discussing, the failure of the attempts to sue Palmer and others 
in the Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage Company case 
and the financial, personal and social exhaustion of the combatants. 
The conflict between the Bells and Mcllwraith is worth examina-
tion. It discloses, as did the revelations over the QNB affair and the 
great strikes of the 'nineties, some of the problems and tensions in 
the comparatively minute world of Queensland high finance, pastoral 
society and political-cum-mercantile Brisbane capitalism. 
In August 1886 J. A. Bell had written to Mcllwraith complaining 
that his income (and that of the other two members of the family) 
had been arbitrarily reduced from £2,000 per annum to a mere 
£1,500. In his reply of 2nd September 1886 Mcllwraith trenchantly 
attempted to instruct the absentee supplicant in the realities of 
pastoral finance and mercantile enterprise.'" He pointed out that 
"your remittance is no longer income but money advanced on the 
security of your shares in the DD&WL Coy Ltd [by the QNB Ltd]. 
The bank may advance as much or as little as they please and [here 
is the sting] may stop advancing and ask you to pay up as soon as 
they choose". Applying both the spur and the whip simultaneous-
ly, Mcllwraith threatened that if he [Mcllwraith] disclosed these stric-
tures to the bank (of which he was principal founder and currently 
secret partner of the Manager, E. R. Drury) then the Directors 
"would immediately tell me to pay up your overdraft . . . [In spite] 
of all, the reality is that what you are doing is drawing out from 
the QNB advance on your capital".'^ 
Mcllwraith then wrote off the Bells. In a letter to his brother 
Andrew, partner in the shipping enterprise Mcllwraith, McEachern, 
Sir Thomas attempted to close this account. 
1 have a thankless job with the Bells. . . It is useless getting angry 
with him for he is an imbecile so I have to humour him to prevent 
designing people getting round him to give more trouble . . . I 
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believe Lady Bell thinks she is rich and teaches the youngsters the 
lesson. I have told her often enough she was in a dangerous posi-
tion, although 1 am pretty sure of pulling her through but if 1 go 
off the hook within the next year or so it will be a bad thing for 
them all.-" 
The last sentence is an ominous one although it was to be another 
ten years, in 1896-97, before Mcllwraith was publicly "off the hook" 
himself. Nevertheless, before then, on 8th April 1886, Mcllwraith 
had given the QNB 796 shares of his DD&WL Company's holdings 
as security for his mounting overdrafts. 
What was going so wrong that even some British investors were 
showing "feelings of despair and frustration" barely three years after 
the company's formation? Already in early 1884 Mcllwraith, after 
his parliamentary defeat by Griffith, had attempted to place nearly 
£100,000 worth of debentures on the London market as "a good 
thing for relieving the QNB of their advances". Sir Charles 
Stirling, Bt, together with the Duke of Manchester, Andrew 
Mcllwraith, William Mackinnon of the British India Steam Naviga-
tion Company and the shadowy Marmaduke Bell were not impress-
ed. Sir Charles Stirhng actually telegraphed the company at Brisbane 
offering his own shares for sale as: 
the system pursued by the Brisbane Directors of keeping us in such 
ignorance of the affairs of the Company . . . upon which I am 
wholly dependent for my income . . . is calculated to engender 
mistrust and unreasonable panic . . . [I have] a vague impression 
that terrible losses are going on or impending . . . and that we have 
no statement of sales or purchases or any data for forming opi-
nion as to whether any one station is paying or losing.-' 
As many investors in Australian securities and speculations found 
to their cost both before and after 1884, ignorance, stifled by in-
terest returns 2%-3% higher than on more gilt-edged securities, often 
turned from bliss to bewildered damnation and a search for 
scapegoats and suitable punishments for those colonials whose pro-
spectuses were far superior to their profits. As the London journal 
The Statist remarked on 28th January 1893 before the May crash, 
Queensland, in many ways "the weakest of all the Austrahan col-
onies, displays the most impudence and least loyalty" of all to British 
capital.'* Now "the most deeply indebted colony or country in the 
world", saddled with unremunerative "political" railways, with only 
about 400,000 men, women and children to pay the interest bills, 
riven by labour troubles, disputes over Separation and falling ex-
port receipts, Queensland's "day of reckoning" was almost nigh. 
From the start the company proved unable to pay a dividend to 
its original investors in spite of making a paper profit of £92,618 
for the three years until 1884. Disastrous droughts, killing 23,000 
sheep and nearly all the Iambs on Jimbour alone, heavy investment 
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in water supplies and marsupial-proof fencing, a rising interest bill, 
sluggish stock prices and difficulties on nearly every property, crippl-
ed the enterprise from the start."* 
By 1883 the company had liabihties of over £801,000. Half of this 
was capital issued to the original vendors in the manner that I have 
already described; £193,000 was in the form of debenture bonds held 
mainly by British investors; the QNB was owed £96,000 on over-
draft and debentures; and a further £85,000 or so was owed to other 
creditors. To offset this were the 51,000 hectares of improved 
freehold land valued at £295,289 on Jimbour and 10,470 hectares 
of land on Buaraba valued at £35,293. In December 1883 the 
whole enterprise ran nearly 250,(X)0 sheep, 40,000 cattle and 2,000 
horses, and produced over £30,000 worth of wool and an equivalent 
amount from fat cattle. Yet even then the interest bill alone was over 
£18,000, double that of the outlay on men's wages.'" 
THE BURDENS OF INTEREST AND NATURAL FORCES 
Things were worse by 1885. Seasons had not replicated those of 
the 1870s and wool and cattle prices were beginning to slide. Interest 
charges were rising and although, as Mcllwraith wryly noted, the 
company held a range of some of the best pastoral properties in 
Queensland, "droughts had extended over the whole term of the 
company's existence" and there had been no dividend paid and no 
profits made. Book profits in 1883 were three years later translated 
into a net loss of over £30,000. Temporary relief came between 1887 
and 1890 when Mcllwraith modestly stated that the worst was over. 
In a letter, at once defensive and self-congratulatory, he writes: 
Few people who have seen the times here do not believe that we 
have managed the Company with great prudence and success. There 
is scarcely another company [that] has stood the ordeal of the last 
few years and can show as little loss. Most companies are ruined 
and a great proportion of their squatters too. 1 have stuck to the 
Company . . . giving it my personal attention for many years when 
my interests would have led me away from Brisbane and 1 claim 
that 1 have saved the Company." 
In a later letter to his brother Andrew, Thomas Mcllwraith 
displayed all the exaltation of the entrepreneur who believes that he 
has emerged from the darkness into the light. On 2nd September 
1886 he wrote: 
The tide has now turned. 1 could not make the seasons better if 
1 had the power. The success of my farming operations is a wonder-
ful relief to my mind and the increased price of wool ensures our 
financial position." 
Three weeks later he wrote of the probability of making £60,000 
clear profit for the DD&WL Company and doubling it in subsequent 
years." 
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But this was the Indian summer. The land was overvalued, cattle 
prices weakened, wool prices slid and interest charges to both British 
debenture holders and the QNB inexorably advanced. It proved im-
possible to dispose of Jimbour land to potential Victorian farmers 
who regarded Queensland as "a sort of nether region only one 
remove from a certain warm place"." 
Finally, the DD&WL Company's affairs were submerged in the 
bank and company crashes and their aftermath in 1893-1897, the 
ruin of Mcllwraith, the Bells and most of the original Queensland 
cast and, as has been stated, the disappearance of the DD&WL Com-
pany a bare twenty years after its formation. 
There are, however, several ironic twists to the story. On 26th 
March 1896 the DD&WL Company gave a Bill of Sale for £323,173 
to the QNB, thus effectively ending what was left of its financial 
independence. Jimbour itself was eventually acquired by the State 
in 1916 for closer settlement, but, as Dr J. C. R. Camm has 
demonstrated, the trials of many of the small grazing and mixed 
farmers were arduous and lengthy." 
Ayrshire Downs station had a further moment of glory — or 
notoriety. A central battleground during the second confrontation 
between striking shearers of the Australian Labour Federation and 
the pastoralists and their political allies, the station had its wool-
shed burnt down on 3rd July 1894. James Martin, an "articulate, 
clever, cynical and bitter" ex-Geelong Grammarian, received fifteen 
years' imprisonment with hard labour at the Rockhampton Court, 
and his associates, David Bowes, Jack Loyola and Edward 
Cowling, ten years each. All were released in December 1900." 
CONCLUSION 
I have attempted in my brief accounts of some of the salient 
features of two land enterprises to resuscitate the territorial perspec-
tive and political dimension to all of this. So far, the economic history 
of Queensland in the nineteenth century, let alone the twentieth, has 
not been written, although there are some excellent accounts both 
published and unpublished that have dealt with certain aspects of 
the colonial economy. Yet the debate over the character and weight 
that should be given to the onslaught of the great depression and 
the relative contributions of external forces and internal difficulties 
and dysfunctions still continues. 
Queensland in 1886 was characterised by dependence on relative-
ly high ratios of investment and then debenture capital from overseas. 
It was an immense territory populated by a miniscule number of peo-
ple, with the concomitant need by Queensland governments to bor-
row for infrastructure and metropolitan development which 
accelerated as the terms of trade worsened. The increasing cost of 
new technologies, the rivalries between competing regions, for ac-
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cess to the public purse — or rather trough — and a dangerous 
dependence on a few export staples were obvious. What were perhaps 
so obvious that historians have tended to neglect them have been 
the vagaries of location and climate, the conflicts of personalities, 
and the problems that eventuated within a dependent economy where 
the financial systems were almost completely deregulated. By the time 
the crunch came, commodity prices had slid, interest charges had 
accelerated and, for many enterprises, the wells of overseas credit 
had run dry at last. 
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